The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) presents an opportunity to compare the
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Introduction
The least-cost approach to limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO2-equivalent gases to 450 parts per million (ppm) requires about 65% of discounted abatement costs, out to 2100, to occur in developing countries. 1 Linking emissions trading schemes, where units originating in one scheme can be used to meet obligations in another, is one way to facilitate resource flows from those who can pay to those who can (more easily) mitigate. The New Zealand Emissions
Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), which began in 2008, was designed so that NZ ETS participants could buy foreign units without limit. This allowed New Zealand to set a target it could be confident of meeting even if domestic mitigation proved difficult and aimed to allow New Zealand to meet its Kyoto target in a globally cost-effective way. Understanding how these linkages affected the New Zealand market is critical both for policy makers in New Zealand and designers of international emissions trading schemes who are considering linkages. Pizer and Yates (2013) show that when two schemes are fully linked and expected to be so indefinitely, and if markets are competitive, units from both sources will trade at the same price.
However most of the New Zealand market effectively had a one-way link. 2 When the Kyoto price was higher than the NZU price, New Zealanders would have liked to sell their NZUs overseas.
Because most could not, Kyoto units may have traded at a premium.
When markets de-link and the de-link is known in advance, prices will diverge immediately (at the announcement rather than at the de-link itself) provided that the high-cost region (which was New Zealand at the time of the de-link) cannot bank enough units before the de-link to lower the future price to the current price of the low-cost region. 3 The price of the high-cost unit (NZUs) is then determined by their scarcity in the de-linked future. We test this hypothesis using data on NZUs and international Kyoto unit prices, coupled with data on the types of units New
Zealand participants banked and surrendered. , which they could then sell to overseas markets. The rationale for this change was the addition of a $25 fixed-price option to the NZ ETS, which created a potential arbitrage opportunity for industrial firms continuing to receive free allocation on an output basis. Firms could have met their obligations using the fixed price option and then sold their freely allocated NZUs abroad at a higher price. Now they can only bank the NZUs if the secondary market exceeds the fixed price. In practice only a small number of NZ AAUs were ever sold overseas because buyers were limited, and so, for simplicity, in this paper we speak of New Zealand as having only a one-way link in the linked period. Buyers included a Japanese company and the Norwegian and Danish governments. (Rickels et al. 2014 ).
In New Zealand, supply-side factors are more likely to have been key drivers of prices.
Linking can be thought of as a supply-side factor as it affects the price of units available to New Zealand participants. In contrast to the EU ETS, the NZ ETS imposed no quantity limit on surrendering Kyoto units from inception until 31 May 2015. Because the NZ ETS was built around linking to Kyoto markets, the government has never applied an explicit domestic cap to the scheme, leaving future unit supply undefined. 7 Because the future supply of units is unknown, the NZU prices after the de-linking announcement are impossible to model. Several papers by Richter and co-authors (Mundaca and Richter, 2013; Richter and Mundaca, 2013; and Richter and Chambers, 2014 ) discuss some of the patterns of prices and uses of domestic and international units. Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch (2016) carry out a financial analysis of prices in the New Zealand ETS but do not focus on the effect of de-linking. Their analysis is consistent with an inability to identify fundamental demand-side drivers of NZU prices.
Unlike the EU ETS, the NZ ETS is very small relative to the Kyoto market, and it was thus a price taker. This paper focuses on the issue of how linkages have affected the NZ ETS price and surrender behaviour.
We find that the NZ ETS behaves as theory would predict. Over the duration of certain linking, there were two distinct price periods. First, when non-forestry sectors would have liked to sell units overseas but could not, NZU prices were around NZD20 and below Kyoto prices.
Second, from June 2011 when Kyoto prices had begun to fall, NZU prices were roughly equal to
Kyoto prices and NZ ETS participants had started buying some international units for compliance. 8 Once the possibility of a future de-link emerged, NZU and Kyoto prices decoupled. The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 gives background on features of the NZ ETS that are relevant to our linking model. For more detail on the NZ ETS see . Section 3 details the model that we use; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 discusses our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
7 This does not mean that the number of NZUs issued is large. Relative to many ETSs, free allocation of units in the New Zealand system is very restricted. Legislative amendments passed in 2012 require a cap to be set before any NZUs are auctioned to increase supply, but this has not (yet) been put into practice. 8 The first unit surrender date in the NZ ETS was 31 May 2011 for all sectors that had entered to date (e.g. forestry, stationary energy and industrial processes).
Background on the NZ ETS
The NZ ETS has its own units, New Zealand Units (NZU), which are issued for free allocation and removals. However, a key feature of the NZ ETS is its linkages to other systems. From the beginning of the scheme firms with obligations were able to submit Kyoto units (Ministry for the Environment 2013a), namely:
• Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which are units issued for projects in developing countries that reduce emissions below business as usual and contribute to sustainable development;
• Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), which are units issued for emission-reduction projects in Annex B (industrialised) countries and which require cancellation of an equivalent number of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) by the host country; 9 and
• Removal Units (RMUs), which are awarded to Annex B countries for net removals in the forestry sector.
Crucially, the way Kyoto units are treated in the NZ ETS has changed over time. 10 Initially it was assumed that Kyoto units would be available to New Zealand firms indefinitely, but on 9
November 2012 New Zealand announced it would not join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (Groser 2012) . This fuelled speculation that New Zealand would no longer have access to Kyoto units and hence that the government would no longer allow them in the ETS. 11
This speculation proved to be correct and on 6 December 2013 it was confirmed that Kyoto units would no longer be allowed for surrender after 31 May 2015 (Bridges 2013 
Data
Our main source of data on prices is CommTrade Carbon (the New Zealand Carbon branch of OMF), which has been one of the largest market players since the ETS began. We observe daily carbon spot prices for NZUs, CERs, and ERUs from 1 January 2011 -1 January 2016. 12 The CER 9 Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) are allocated to Annex B countries at the beginning of each commitment period in relation to their Kyoto target. Imported AAUs are not accepted in the NZ ETS; NZ AAUs are but few have been issued to private holders. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, 'Kyoto unit' refers to the following types of Kyoto units: CERs, ERUs and RMUs. 10 Some qualitative restrictions applied to CERs and ERUs that were eligible in the NZ ETS. From inception, the NZ ETS did not accept ERUs and CERs associated with nuclear projects or CERs associated with forestry projects in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (tCERs and lCERs). From December 2011, CERs associated with industrial-gas destruction projects involving HFC-23 and N2O were prohibited. From December 2012, ERUs associated with industrial-gas destruction projects and both ERUs and CERs associated with large hydro projects were prohibited. 11 The Environmental Protection Authority quickly announced that Kyoto units would be available until at least the end of 31 May 2015 (Environmental Protection Authority 2012). 12 We also have some sparse price data from January 2008 but there were few trades and these data were not consistently recorded.
and ERU prices reflect prices from international trades that have been converted to New Zealand dollars using that day's exchange rate. The NZU price reflects data on trades occurring through the CommTrade platform. We cross-checked these NZU prices with data from another broker and found them to be almost identical. 13 One weakness of our NZU data set is that in many instances there are no trades on a given day. The sparsity of the data partly reflects a lack of liquidity in a small nascent market. Although forestry participants, including those with liabilities for deforestation, had been included in the ETS since 1 January 2008, stationary energy and liquid fuel participants, who are the major source of demand, did not enter until 1 July 2010.
For our analysis the price is, in some cases, recorded as that of the last trade before that date (so that in cases where there are no trades for, say, five days we observe the same price on each day). In other cases when there are no trades the price is recorded as missing. This is problematic because if we observe, say a NZU price of $20 for each of five consecutive days, when there are no trades on that day and the Kyoto price is changing on each day, then it is unfair to claim the two prices are different, as the latent NZU price (the price at which it would have traded had there been any trades) may well have been the same. On the other hand it is possible, when we observe a series of days with the same NZU price, that there were in fact trades on those days, all occurring at exactly the same price.
To resolve this difficulty we conduct our analysis in two ways. Firstly we use all of the data including the data with repeated NZU prices, and secondly we exclude all the NZU prices that are the same as the last observed day. Our results are unaffected. Figure 1 shows that prior to late June 2011 CERs traded at a non-trivial premium relative to NZUs. The divergence in the early period illustrates the importance of New Zealand's effective one-way link rather than two-way link. Had the link been two-way, participants would have had an incentive to sell their units to overseas buyers at a higher price. Given New Zealand is small enough in the international market to be a price taker, then a two-way link likely would have resulted in NZUs trading at the higher CER price observed in this early period. ound., prices actually began to diverge more than one month before the announcement. This suggests that some traders thought that New Zealand's withdrawal from Kyoto was likely and anticipated the probable effect on markets: the Minister's announcement was not a complete surprise to all.
Results

Prices
14 The theoretical prediction is subject to the caveat that New Zealanders banked all their NZUs for future use, which as we will see in Figure 3 , happened bar a trivial number of surrenders. Figure 1 provides strong prima facie evidence for the effects of New Zealand's linking policy on price. We also apply several statistical tests to confirm this.
First we calculate the correlation between NZU prices and CERs, and the correlation between NZU prices and ERUs both before and after the November 9 announcement. As shown in Table 1 these are almost 1 for both CERs and ERUs in the period before New Zealand announced its delink, and negative thereafter. Both of these changes are statistically significant. Second we obtain a difference in difference estimate of the effect. That is, we estimate, Equation (1).
Where price , is the price for unit of type on day . is a dummy for the NZU unit that captures the average difference between the NZU and the Kyoto units. are daily fixed effects, and , the coefficient of interest, is the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the delinking announcement. That is, it represents the extra difference between the Kyoto unit price and the NZU price, after accounting for the initial (pre-period) difference.
The identifying assumption behind a difference-in-difference estimate is that in the absence of 'treatment' (in our case the linking announcement) the two prices would have moved in parallel. If the New Zealand and Kyoto markets were always perfectly integrated and linked, and would both equal zero. While this difference is only around 33 cents, and so is small relative to the movement of about $20 observed over the full period, it shows some evidence of anticipation.
In all specifications β is positive, significant at the 1% level, and meaningful in magnitude. The difference-in-difference estimate gets larger as the period following the announcement is extended, between (3) and (4). 15 The divergence grew over time as the NZU experienced upward shocks (possibly reflecting gradually increasing confidence in the future stringency of the NZ ETS as the government confirmed and then implemented the de-link) while Kyoto units experienced negative shocks. 
Surrender and banking
The New Zealand Emission Unit Register (NZEUR) provides data on the types of units surrendered in each calendar year. These data are shown in Figure 3 . 16 Changes in total surrenders partly reflect changes in gross emissions (and the increase from 2011 to 2012 reflects the mid-year entry date of the stationary energy and liquid fuel sectors) but are mostly driven by surrender of units to cover harvesting or deregistration of forestry ETS participants.
Forestry participants were able to take advantage of low Kyoto prices to reduce their liabilities and to deforest (Kerr, Carver, and Dawson 2016) . 16 See the New Zealand Emission Unit Register for annual surrender and other data. 17 We imagine that the small amount of NZUs surrendered reflect small operators with large transactions costs of trading. Since many view the cheap Kyoto units as non-additional it is also possible that some non-profit-maximising participants may have surrendered NZUs in an attempt to be more "green". 
Conclusion
From theory economists expect linking arrangements to have important effects on prices, surrender and banking behaviour. Specifically Pizer and Yates (2013) have shown that prices should be equal across systems when two-way linking is expected to continue, and deviate once future linkages are uncertain with participants in high-cost regions, such as New Zealand, banking all their own units for future use and surrendering only cheap overseas units.
We find that this simple theory accords very well with reality. The NZU price reaction to the de-linking announcement (rather than the de-link itself) also shows strong evidence of the New Zealand carbon market reacting in the present to news about the future: a key property of any well-functioning market. Even a small, nascent and relatively illiquid market that faces considerable uncertainty about medium-term demand and supply reacts rationally to changes in supply-side factors. The long period of price divergence has led to a large privately held bank 20 It is not straightforward to calculate the size because forester behaviour would have been different in this scenario so both allocation and surrender of NZUs would have been affected. that is a liability to the New Zealand government in the post-Paris world and reduces the government's ability to raise revenue by auctioning NZUs. 
Appendix Additional regressions
Estimating the size of the 'bank'
The New Zealand Emission Unit Register (NZEUR)'s Holding & Transaction Summary does not provide an estimate of the stock of private holdings, the bank. However it does provide information on the flows of units into and out of private hands each year. From these it is possible to construct a good estimate of the bank's size. From the NZEUR, we can see details about allocations and surrender over time, up until December 2015. In this section we explain how we calculated the bank in 2015; previous years are calculated using the same methodology. 21 NZUs can leave or enter private holdings in two more ways: they can be transferred back to the New Zealand government for repayment or transferred to participants as reimbursement. This usually occurs when an entity is allocated units and the size of the allocation is subsequently revised. This number is not reported in the NZEUR Holding & Transaction Summary, but can be found in the annual reports on the EPA website. Unfortunately these numbers are not broken down by unit type, but net reimbursements are around half a million, and so for our purpose small enough to be ignored when calculating the bank. 22 The information for the number of NZUs surrendered and cancelled can be found on the NZEUR Unit Holding & Transaction Summary page. Information on the NZUs converted for overseas sale can be found on the NZU conversions page. 23 A small number of international AAUs (5,281,818) have entered private holdings from overseas transfers. International AAUs are no longer allowed to be surrendered in the NZ ETS so we don't want to include them in our estimate of the bank, and hence we exclude them from our calculations. These units may be counted in the outflows, through units transferred overseas, in which case we should include them in the inflow. At any rate, how we deal with these units is not too important relative to the size of the bank, as can be seen from Figure 4 . 
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